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Unpleasant arithmetics at the Central Bank of Iraq

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Unpleasant arithmetics at the Central Bank of Iraq  Empty Unpleasant arithmetics at the Central Bank of Iraq

Post  Admin Tue May 28, 2013 6:01 pm

Monday, 27 May 2013



In its conflict with the central bank, the Iraqi
government got its economics wrong. Twice.





The last few weeks saw a
further
decline in the value of the Iraqi dinar. The
gap between market and the official exchange rates reached its peak in the
second week of May when the dollar was being sold for around 1290 dinars; 10%
above the official rate of 1166 dinars to the dollar. This might be surprising
since for several years prior to 2012, the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) managed
to maintain a narrow gap between the official and market rates using
its daily currency auctions.





The story of how the Iraqi
foreign exchange market went from stability to volatility in the space of 18
months can be divided into three episodes.





Episode 1 (Jan 2012 – May 2012): Two explanations for
an emerging gap




In early 2012, The CBI and
the government offered two different explanations for a newly-emerging gap emerged
between official and market exchange rates.
Mudher Salih, then the deputy governor
of the CBI, attributed the gap to excess demand from the neighbouring Syria and
Iran—which were facing foreign currency shortages due to sanctions. Meanwhile,
Izzat Al-Shahbandar,
an MP and an aide to PM
Maliki, blamed the stringent measures of the CBI, which hindered the
foreign currency
supply, for the emergence of the gap. Shahbandar claimed that prior to
2012, the CBI sold $200 million on average in its daily auctions, but
that figure fell to
$100 million in 2012.





Contrary to Shahbandar’s
claims however, CBI’s data (summarised in the table below) show that the amount
of dollars sold had in fact increased in
the
period from January to May 2012 relative to previous years. The data
leaves
little doubt which of the two explanations is more plausible - the only
question mark is about the source of Shahbandar's figures.







Unpleasant arithmetics at the Central Bank of Iraq  Iraq+FX+table


Episode 2 (May 2012 – Oct 2012): The CBI increases
supply and gets its governor sacked




To meet the excess demand,
the CBI significantly increased its supply of dollars, successfully bringing
the market price down to within 3% of the official rate in early October (see the
chart below). At that point, an arrest warrant was issued against its governor,
Sinan Al-Shabibi, over allegations of “
of financial irregularities” related to the currency
auctions. A more detailed report by the
Board of Supreme Audit (BSA) concluded
that the CBI’s loose control over the auctions encouraged smuggling of the
dollar out of the country and money laundering.





The change in tone is
notable: in October, the CBI was being accused of leniency in running its
currency auctions, having been (falsely) accused of stringency in May!






Unpleasant arithmetics at the Central Bank of Iraq  Iraq+FX+chart

Episode 3 (Oct 2012 – present): The CBI restricts
dollar supply




Over this period, volumes
in the CBI’s auctions averaged $177 million—a significant drop from the
previous episode. This appears to be a deliberate policy as can be inferred
from the appointment of the head of the BSA as the interim governor and CBI’s
statements on 18 and 24 October 2012.





An unsurprising outcome of
restricted supply is the significant rise in the market value of the dollar,
which reached a high this month. It is hard to tell what is going to happen
next, but the
politicians who have been
actively involved
in the saga now seem concerned with the uncomfortable fall of the
dinar.





Epilogue

The last part of the chart
shows a sharp pick-up in the auction volumes over the last few days (almost to the
levels reached by Shabibi before his dismissal) coupled with a narrowing of the
gap between market and official rates. It would be a positive change if this
trend continued. Currency smuggling, unnecessary depletion of CBI’s resources
and money laundering must be fought of course. But this should be done through
a legal and supervisory framework not through the excessively powerful tools of
monetary policy. One should not starve the patient to death in order to kill
the bacteria.


http://ziaddaoud.blogspot.com/2013/05/unpleasant-arithmetics-at-central-bank.html

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